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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF U T A H
Plaintiff-Respondent
vs

'

/

Case No.
13649

NEIL DIXON
Defendant-Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF
T H E N A T U R E O F T H E CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction of robbery, a
felony of the second degree, in the Third District Court
for the State of Utah.

D I S P O S I T I O N IN T H E L O W E R COURT
The appellant, Neil Dixon, was convicted by a
jury of the crime of robbery on February 26, 1974, in
1
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the Court of the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson, and
was sentenced to serve the indeterminate term provided
by law in the Utah State Prison, namely one to fifteen
years.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment of
guilt entered against him and a new trial in this matter.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On December 8, 1973, about midnight, Jack D .
Patterson, on duty as a clerk at a Seven-Eleven grocery store located at 4657 West and 5415 South in
Kearns, was robbed. Mr. Patterson described the robber as black with a nylon stocking over his face to his
nose, wearing a green field jacket and a blue stocking
cap. In addition, he stated the robber had a "scraggly
beard" and a .22 caliber pearl-handled revolver. The
robber took something less than $20, then fled on foot.
(T. 4-13)
Deputy David Kelly, Salt Lake County Sheriff's
Office, testified that he was observing traffic at the
intersection of 35th South and Redwood Road approximately 12:25 a.m. when he observed a passenger
in a vehicle who was black. H e followed the vehicle
for some blocks, then stopped it when other police
vehicles arrived on the scene. The defendant, who was
the passenger, and another black man were ordered out
2
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of the vehicle at gunpoint. The officers took a blue
stocking cap and a .22 caliber revolver from the vehicle.
The defendant was wearing a green jacket. ( T . 49-55)
T h e defendant informed the police and testified
at trial that he and the driver of the vehicle, his cousin
G a r y Scott, were searching for his sister-in-law's
mother's house on the west side of town that evening,
and that the pistol belonged to his grandmother and
he intended to take it to her that evening. H e denied
emphatically having been involved in a robbery. ( T .
99-114)
The appellant's grandmother, Mrs. Olivia Scott,
testified the pistol in fact belonged to her, and she had
loaned it to her grandson, the appellant's brother, some
months earlier. ( T . 142-144)
I n addition, the driver of the vehicle, G a r y Scott,
could not be found by either the appellant ( T . 113114), or the State ( T . 137-138), and the charges
against M r . Scott had been dismissed. ( T . 67, 137)
W h e n placed on the stand at the outset of the defendant's case, the victim, J a c k D . Patterson, who had
previously testified for the State, reiterated that he
thought the robber was five feet four inches tall and
distinctly smaller than himself. W h e n asked to stand
next to the appellant, he estimated the appellant's
height at five feet ten inches, nearly equal to his. H e
admitted the floor where he was standing was level
with the floor where the robber was standing at the
grocery store. ( T . 97-98) Sgt. Bruce E g a n testified
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that the description of the robber dispatched over his
radio was five feet four inches in height. (T. 44)
Deputy David Kelly had previously testified that the
stocking cap found in the appellant's car was not unusual and that the officer owned several caps like it
himself. (T. 65)
In addition, the green field jacket belonging to
appellant, and introduced into evidence had a black
collar and was not the standard army type field jacket.
(T. 65) The victim, Mr. Patterson, did not recall seeing a black collar on the jacket of the robber. (T. 20)
Finally, the revolver which belonged to appellant's
grandmother and which was taken from appellant's car
had a broken plastic grip which Mr. Patterson testified
he did not notice on the pistol used by the robber. (T.
22) The pistol was broken and could not have been
fired when seized by the police. (T. 109).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
I T E M S OF P H Y S I C A L E V I D E N C E SEIZE D BY T H E POLICE FROM T H E V E H I C L E
IN W H I C H T H E APPELLANT WAS RIDING W E R E T H E FRUITS OF AN I L L E G A L
AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL ARREST AND
SEARCH, AND T H E R E F O R E ,
SHOULD
H A V E B E E N S U P P R E S S E D BY T H E T R I A L
COURT.
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I n the trial of this matter, three items of evidence:
a blue stocking cap, (State's Exhibit N o . 1 ) , a .22
caliber revolver (State's Exhibit N o . 2 ) , and a green
army-type field jacket (State's Exhibit N o . 3 ) , were
introduced into evidence over the appellant's objection.
( T . 145-6)
Appellant argues that these three items, the cap,
gun, and coat were the fruits of an illegal arrest and
search and seizure and therefore, were violative of U t a h
law and the rights of the defendant under both the
U t a h and the United States' Constitutions.
Appellant admits that the cap and coat belonged
to him ( T . 106, 107), and that he had control of the
gun as he was returning it to his grandmother. ( T .
108, 109) H e , therefore, has the proper standing to
object to their admissability against him at his trial.
Kaufman v. U.S., 394 U . S . 217, 22 L . E d . 2d 227,
89 S. Ct. 1068 (1969).
The thrust of appellant's argument is that the
police officer in question, D e p u t y David Kelly of the
Salt L a k e County Sheriff's Office, stopped the vehicle
in which appellant was riding and examined it without
probable cause to believe that the appellant, or the
driver of the car, G a r y Scott, had committed any violation of the laws of the State of Utah, traffic or penal.
Appellant contends that D e p u t y Kelly, who was
sitting at an intersection, and who had heard that a
black was involved in a robbery, merely stopped the
first car he saw with a black man in it. I n fact, D e p u t y
Kelly admitted this at trial. ( T . 59)
5
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No description of a vehicle was ever broadcast for
there were no witnesses who testified that a vehicle was
involved. Deputy Kelly admitted he was not watching
for a vehicle, but a person. (T. 60) Deputy Kelly
further testified that he had the following information:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)

a male black,
approximately five foot nine, 140 pounds,
wearing a dark green coat,
with a scraggley beard,
and a dark stocking cap,
had robbed a Seven-Eleven Store in Kearns
a few moments prior. (T. 51)

Sgt. Egan, Deputy Kelly's supervisor, differed
with Deputy Kelly and had previously testified that
the broadcast description of the robber was five foot
four inches tall, (T. 35) which was the description
given by the victim, Mr. Patterson, to the police. (T.
24) In addition, Sgt. Egan, in describing the broadcast, omitted the "scraggly beard" aspect of the description. (T. 35)
Deputy Kelly testified that while sitting at the
intersection of Redwood Road and 35th South, he observed a vehicle with two blacks pull up to the red
light there. H e testified that he noticed the passenger
was a male black with a scraggly beard and a green
coat on, from twenty to twenty-five feet away. H e admitted the suspect was not wearing a stocking cap. (T.
58) H e also omitted any statement as to observation
6
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of a traffic violation by the driver of the vehicle. In
fact, he testified the passenger's features were the only
reason he followed the vehicle. (T. 52)
Section 41-1-17, Utah Code Annotated, (1953)
requires that police officers have ". . . reasonable belief that (a) vehicle is being operated in violation of
any provision of this act (Motor Vehicle Act) or of
any other law regulating the operation of vehicles . . . "
before they may stop a vehicle and make inquiry of the
driver. Such a law prevents a police officer from stopping any vehicle he desires upon whim, caprice or
"hunch", and therefore unreasonably disturbing the personal privacy of the driver and occupants of such
vehicle.
In the case at bar, Deputy Kelly admits by inference (T. 52), and by omission that the driver of the
vehicle was not stopped because Deputy Kelly had "reasonable belief" that a provision of the Motor Vehicle
Act was being violated. His justification for stopping
the vehicle, therefore, becomes a question of whether
or not he had probable cause to believe that the passenger in that vehicle, appellant Neil Dixon, had violated the law. If he did not have probable cause to
stop the vehicle, the items taken from the vehicle are
inadmissable on the grounds that they were the fruits
of an illegal arrest and search, and or the fruits of an
illegal stop of a motor vehicle under Section 41-1-17,
Utah Code Annotated, (1953).
We, therefore, turn to the issue of probable cause
for arrest and search without a warrant, and explore
7
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the case law defining what constitutes probable cause
for belief of violation of a crime on the part of a police
officer.
The first authoritative pronouncement on probable cause concerned arrests and searches without a
warrant. In Wrightson v. U.S., 222 F . 2d 556 (1955),
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit reversed a robbery conviction for the reason
that the arrest in the case, made without a warrant, was
made without "probable cause", and, therefore, all items
seized as a result of such arrest should have been excluded by the trial court. The Court there held that:
"An officer must show 'probable cause' to get a
warrant from a magistrate, and he must have
'probable cause" to make an arrest without a
warrant. . . We are here at the very heart of due
process of law and, more directly, at the essence
of the Fourth Amendment." 222 F . 2d at 558.
In the instant case, items were seized from the car
in which appellant was riding after he was ordered
from the car at gunpoint. (T. 62) Appellant contends that those items were the fruits of an unlawful
arrest and search because the stopping of the car and
the subsequent requirement that the appellant and Mr.
Scott exit the vehicle at gunpoint constituted an arrest.
The fact that the words "you're under arrest" were not
pronounced prior to the officer's search of the vehicle
is immaterial. In Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40,
20 L. Ed. 2d 917, 88 S. Ct. 1889 (1968), the United
States Supreme Court held that a search incident to a
lawful arrest may not precede the arrest and serve as
8
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p a r t of its justification. The legality of the search
therefore depends upon the legality of the arrest. Chimel v. California, 395 U . S . 752, 23 L . E d 2d 685, 89 S.
Ct. 2034 (1969).
I t therefore follows that in order for an arrest to
be legal and constitutional, it must be made with a warrant or with the same probable cause required for a
warrant. The reasoning of Justice Jackson, writing
for the majority of the U . S. Supreme Cou t in United
States v. Di Re, 332 U . S . 581, 68 S. Ct. 222, 92 L . E d .
210 (1948) would seem to apply to the arrest and
search in the instant case:
" W e have had frequent occasion to point out
that a search is not to be made legal by what it
turns up. I n law it is good or bad when it starts
and does not change character from its success."
332 U . S . at 595.
The reasoning of Justice Jackson was buttressed
by the Wrightson court, supra, when it said:
"The requirement of 'probable cause' for action
without a warrant is surely no less exacting than
is the necessity for 'probable cause' for the issuance of a warrant. But, if officers can arrest
without a warrant and never be required to disclose the facts upon which they based their belief
of probable cause — if in other words, they have
an untouchable power to arrest without a warrant — why should they ever bother to get a
warrant?" 222 F . 2d at 559.
W e now come to the question of whether or not
the concept of "fitting the general description" con-
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stitutes probable cause for a police officer to stop a
vehicle, search it and arrest the occupants. I t is clear
that in the instant case Deputy Kelly relied totally
on the fact that the appellant fit the general description of a robbery suspect to stop the vehicle, search it,
and arrest the appellant. (T. 51)
In Brown v. Teras, 481 S.W. 2d 106 (1972), the
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas held that where
a police officer had no specific knowledge connecting
any of the defendants whom he observed in an automobile with an armed robbery he was aware of, and
where the description of the robbers contained no identifiable characteristics which would distinguish them
from the general population, the officer lacked probable cause to arrest the defendants without a warrant
for robbery and items found in the warrantless search
of the automobile were inadmissable. The description
of the three holdup men consisted only of a designation
as to race and an approximation as to height and weight.
The Court there said:
"Probable cause for an arrest exists where, at
that moment, the facts and circumstances within
the knowledge of the arresting officer and of
which he has reasonable trustworthy information,
would warrant a reasonable and prudent man in
believing that a particular person has committed,
or is committing a crime. . . The inarticulate
hunch, suspicion or good faith of an arresting
officer is insufficient to constitute probable
cause. . ." (emphasis supplied) 481 S.W. 2d at
110.
10
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The Court went on to point out that the general
description of the robbers that the officer had been
given could have done no more than raise the officer's
suspicion that the three men in the car were robbers.
That suspicion alone, the Court said, did not constitute
probable cause to stop the car, search it, and arrest the
occupants. 481 S.W. 2d 112.
The police officer in the instant case, as in Brown,
had no specific information linking appellant to the
robbery. In fact, as was the case in Brown, Deputy
Kelly had no reason to believe the robber of the Kearns
store was in a vehicle and he was not looking for a
specific vehicle. (T. 60) Lacking specific information
linking the appellant to the Seven-Eleven robbery, the
officer lacked probable cause to arrest him for that
crime or to search the vehicle in which he was riding.
Whitely v. Warden ^Wyoming Penitentiary, 401 U.S.
560, 91 S. Ct. 1031, 28 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1971). Further,
in Carrol v. United States, 267 U.S. 432, 45 S. Ct.
280, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1923) and Henry v. United States,
361 U.S. 98, 80 S. Ct. 168, 4 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1969),
the United States Supreme Court, while holding that
the fact that suspects are in a car is a factor to be considered in determining whether exigent circumstances
existed which precluded obtaining a warrant, also held
that such a fact did not dispense with the need for
probable cause." Henry, supra.
Finally, the most persuasive case to be considered
by this Court should be Gatlin v. U.S., 326 F . 2d 266
(1963) in which the United States Court of Appeals

U
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

for the District of Columbia reversed the robbery conviction of a black man because he was arrested without
probable cause. This case should be particularly persuasive to this Court because its facts seem to square
"on all fours" with the facts of the instant case. I n
Gatlin, the Court said:
"Gatlin's arrest was without probable cause. I t
was an arrest for investigation. The only evidence on which arrest was predicated was the fact
that there was a robbery, that one of the robbers
was a Negro wearing a trench coat, that a Negro
man fled from a taxi, and that Gatlin, a Negro
man, was observed walking down the street a
mile and a half from the robbery wearing a
trench coat. This is not the type of evidence
which justifies deprivation of liberty. (Emphasis
added) 326 F . 2d at 670-1.
In the instant case, it will be recalled that the
knowledge of Deputy Kelly at the time he spotted appellant was that a robbery had occurred; that the
robber was a black man approximately five feet nine
inches tall and weighing 140 pounds; that he was wearing a green coat and dark stocking cap; and (assuming
arguendo, he was correct) the robber had a scraggly
beard. (T. 51) Deputy Kelly observed the appellant,
a black man with a scraggly beard wearing a green
coat. The facts are essentially identical to the Gatlin
case in which all evidence seized, i.e. a toy gun and
$50 in cash, was held to be inadmissible because the
police officer had no probable cause for arrest. The
only significant factual difference in the two cases is
that, in Gatlin the suspect was on foot, and in the in12
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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stant case, the suspect was a passenger in a vehicle.
That fact itself would seem to strengthen appellant's
argument in that the officer had no reason to believe
the robber would be in a vehicle. (T. 60)
In conclusion, it would seem appropriate to sum
up by once again quoting from Mr. Justice Jackson's
majority opinion in United States v. Di Re, supra:
"We meet in this case, as in many, the appeal to
necessity. It is said that if such arrests and
searches cannot be made, law enforcement will
be more difficult and uncertain. But the forefathers, after consulting the lessons of history,
designed our Constitution to place obstacles in
the way of a too permeating police surveillance,
which they seemed to think was a greater danger
to a free people than the escape of some criminals from punishment. Taking the law as it has
been given to us, this arrest and search were beyond the lawful authority of those who executed
them. The conviction based on evidence so obtained cannot stand." 332 U.S. at 595.
Appellant asks this Court to reverse his conviction
and remand the case for a new trial, with an order
suppressing all evidence obtained as a result of the unlawful arrest of defendant and search of the vehicle in
which he was a passenger.
POINT II
T H E ADMISSION OF A POLICE PHOTOG R A P H OF A P P E L L A N T AT TRIAL WAS
N O N - P R O B A T I V E A N D SO P R E J U D I C I A L
AS TO D E N Y A P P E L L A N T A F A I R T R I A L .
13
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The State's attorney in this matter elicited testimony from Roger F . Taylor of the Salt Lake County
Sheriff's Office concerning eight photographs shown
to the witness, Mr. Patterson, three days after the
robbery occurred. (T. 71-74) Appellant's attorney objected to testimony concerning these items and the objection was overruled by the Court. (T. 73-4)
Exhibit No. 8, a photograph of appellant, was
procured by the officer the day following the robbery,
and Officer Taylor testified further that Exhibit No.
8 was a police photograph taken the night appellant
was arrested in this matter. (T. 72) The other photographs, Exhibit Nos. 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were not
admitted into evidence due to appellants objection, but
Exhibit No. 8, the photograph of appellant, was admitted over appellant's objection. (T. 95-6) This
objection was later renewed as the basis for a motion
for mistrial which the Court also denied. (T. 148-9)
Appellant assigns the admission of Exhibit No. 8 into
evidence and the subsequent denial of a mistrial on that
basis as error in this appeal.
This Court, in observing Exhibit No. 8, will note
that it is a particularly bad picture. The hair is unkempt, the dress of the appellant in unkempt. One
might say the photograph gives the appellant the look
of a criminal, when in court appellant appeared altogether different. Below appellant's photograph are
numbers and the words " S A L T L A K E C O U N T Y
S H E R I F F ' S O F F I C E . " The photograph is actually
two pictures, a side view and a front view. Such a
14
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photograph of any innocent person may make that
person look like a criminal.
The crux of appellant's objection revolves around
the probative value of such a photograph. Perhaps if
all eight photographs were admitted into evidence for
the j u r y ' s consideration, they would be relevant to show
that the witness picked appellant's picture from a number of pictures of people who looked like him. The
State's attorney seemed to offer them into evidence for
this purpose. Oddly enough, the Court excluded all
photographs except that of the appellant. H a d appellant's attorney attempted to introduce a picture of
appelant as a choir boy in church, such an offer would
undoubtedly have been denied as non-probative. W h a t
probative value then, is involved in a police photograph
of the appellant which is such a bad likeness, he appears to resemble the average person's concept of a
criminal?
Appellant believes that the admission of State's
Exhibit No. 8 was so prejudicial as to have denied
him a fair trial and asks that the j u d g m e n t of the
lower court be reversed and the matter remanded for a
new trial.

POINT

III

THE
STATEMENT
OF T H E
TRIAL
J U D G E DURING APPELLANT'S CLOSING
ARGUMENT
GAVE
THE
IMPRESSION
T H A T T H E TRIAL J U D G E D I D NOT BE15
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

L I E V E A P P E L L A N T S T E S T I M O N Y CONCERNING AN ALIBI WITNESS,
AND
THEREFORE PREJUDICED THE
JURY
A N D D E N I E D A P P E L L A N T H I S R I G H T TO
A FAIR TRIAL.
Enclosed in the Record of the case before the court
is a handwritten statement by the Honorable Joseph
G. Jeppson. (R. 33) In the statement Judge Jeppson
states that:
"Mr. Keller (defense attorney) in substance
argues that the witness Scott could not be found
anywhere. They had looked all over for him.
Mr. Bullen (State's attorney) interrupted him
and objected that the evidence did not show such
a search.
I sustained the objection and said the evidence
did not show that anyone had looked very hard
for him.
I have written this within an hour after the verdict so I can recall it if asked later. I doubt
that the reporter recorded it. She was not reporting the argument and says she can't take the
part of the argument after it was given and
while an objection is being made." (R. 33)
A reading of the transcript of trial shows that,
in fact, the closing arguments, and therefore the
Judge's statements, were not recorded.
Appellant argues that the Judge could have sustained the prosecutor's objection without comment,
however, the comment, " . . . the evidence did not show
16
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that anyone looked very hard for him. . .", was highly
prejudicial to appellant since it tended to indicate, by
its very nature, that the Judge did not believe the witness would provide an alibi for appellant. Although
the State may argue that such a statement was not
prejudicial since the Court instructed the jury that it
did not intend to express an opinion on the evidence
during the course of the trial, (R. 26), it will be noted
that the Court instructed the jury prior to closing
argument, and such a statement by a judge cannot help
but influence a jury who looks to the judge during the
entire trial for judgment and guidance as to its duty.
The witness in question, Gary Scott, was driving
the vehicle in which appellant was riding when it was
stopped on Redwood Road by Deputy Kelly. (T. 63)
Appellant testified that he had been with Scott for
several hours, including the time the robbery occurred.
(T. 100-5) Mr. Scott is the only person who could have
supported defendant's statements that he did not commit the robbery. However, the charges were dropped
against Mr. Scott, (T. 67) and Mr. Dixon was subsequently unable to locate him despite his efforts to
do so. (T. 113-4)
The defense even went so far as to call Herschel
Bullen, the State's attorney, to the stand. Mr. Bullen
testified that the State had attempted to subpoena Mr.
Scott, but that the subpoena was returned unserved.
(T. 137-8)
Counsel for appellant moved for mistrial on the
basis of the Court's comment, but the motion was
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denied. (T. 149) Appellant cites this fact as his third
assignment of error in this case.
It goes without necessity for documentation that
a fair trial is the most fundamental requirement of
Due Process of Law; and "a fair trial means a trial
before an impartial judge and an honest jury in an
atmosphere of judicial calm." 21 AM. J r . 2d § 235.
When a trial judge loses his impartiality, he jeopordizes a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial.
Gudger v. U.S., (App D.C.) 314 F . 2d 268 (1960).
Recognizing this fact, the American Bar Association's
Canons of Judicial Ethics, Canon 15, states in part:
". . . (The Judge) should avoid interruptions of
counsel in their arguments except to clarify his
mind as to their positions, and he should not be
tempted to the unnecessary display of learning
or a premature judgment."
The language of this Court has always upheld the
proposition that a trial judge or prosecutor should refrain from doing or saying anything that might prejudice a defendant's right to a fair trial in a criminal
case. In State v. Jameson, 103 Utah 129, 134 P . 2d
173 (1943), the Utah Supreme Court declared:
"Both the court and the prosecutors should be
zealous in protecting the rights of an accused,
and should carefully refrain from doing or saying anything from which it might be inferred
that an unfair advantage was taken of a defendant." 134 P . 2d at 175-176.
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In State v. Musser, 110 Utah 534, 175 P . 2d 724
(1946), the Utah Supreme Court stated emphatically:
"The Court's remark, if construed by the jury as
indicated, would constitute a comment on the
evidence. In this jurisdiction, such comment is
not within the province of the Court." 175 P . 2d
at 738.
In that case the Court discussed the probable prejudicial effect of a trial judge's comment during the trial,
and although the Court did not reverse on that basis,
it clearly indicated such comment was error.
". . . And if so understood by the jury, the remark could not be characterized as non-prejudicial. Characterizing as 'nefarious' a publication written by a defendant and used by other
defendants in what they contended was propagation of religious views, could not but convey
to the minds of the jurors the impression that
the court thought that the writer of the book
and the propagators of the views therein expressed are iniquitous." 175 P . 2d at 738.
The most persuasive and authoritative pronouncement of this Court, with respect to a trial judge's comments is found in State v. Rosenbaum, 22 Utah 2d 159,
449 P . 2d 999 (1969). In that case, this Court reversed the burglary conviction of a criminal defendant
on the ground that the trial judge's comment to the
jury regarding the weight to be given to defendant's
alibi constituted prejudicial error. The comment was
in the form of a cautionary instruction. The Court
held:
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"We think that in this case it was prejudicial
error for the court to indicate to the jury that
they should apply a different standard for determining the weight of evidence regarding alibi
from that which they were to apply to any other
evidence in the case." 449 P . 2d at 1002.
Directly in point with the instant case, Justice
Ellet began his majority opinion by declaring:
"In this state the trial judge is not permitted to
comment on evidence and he, therefore, may not
indicate to a jury that evidence is either weak
or convincing. It is the sole and exclusive province of the jury to determine the facts in a criminal case, and this it must do regardless of the
relative strength or weakness of the evidence in
the case, (emphasis added) 449 P . 2d at 1000.
It seems clear then, that in the State of Utah, where
a trial judge is not allowed to comment on the evidence, any such comment constitutes error. And, as
Justice EUett observed in Rosenbaum, such comment
indicating strength or weakness of evidence is prejudicial error.
In the instant case, the trial judge commented on
the evidence when he stated that:
". . . the evidence did not show that anyone
looked very hard for him (alibi witness) . . ."
(R. 33)
In determining the possible prejudicial effect of such
statement, this Court must consider that the comment
was made immediately after the judge had sustained the
State's attorney's objection to the defense attorney's
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argument on the evidence during closing argument, and
after the jury had been instructed by the court. Since
it was the appellant who was to have relied on the witnesses testimony as part of his alibi defense, the logical
inference and conclusion to be drawn by the jury was
that the judge believed that the appellant didn't try
very hard to find the witness and so was lying when he
testified that the witness could provide him with an
alibi. (T. 113)
Appellant asks this Court to consider the weight
of authority presented in prior Utah Supreme Court
decisions and grant him a new trial as it did for appellant Rosenbaum, supra.

CONCLUSION
On the basis of the three assignments of error heretofore presented, appellant urges this Court to reverse
the judgment of the trial court and grant him a new
trial in this matter.
Respectfully submitted,
L A R R Y R. K E L L E R
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